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Abstract
In this paper we present a political economy approach in order to explain
the degree of financial openness for an economy. In the model, entrepreneurs,
who may have good or bad projects, vote for policies, which are proposed by
selfish politicians. Two political frictions (ideological adherence and a super-
majority requirement) impair political competition and lead to equilibria, where
politicians receive corruption bribes. Furthermore, the model implies a non-
monotonic relationship between financial openness and corruption and a positive
relationship between financial openness and government size. Some of the model
predictions are consistent with empirical findings while other predictions have not
beeen tested yet.
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1 Introduction
Theories of financial openness emphasize various economic reasons for explaining the
international flows of capital. A commonly provided cause of openness is the need
for risk diversification through the trading of financial assets between countries with
different productivity shocks. Examples of this type of argument and its implications
for growth are provided by various papers, such as Devereux and Smith (1994) and
Obstfeld (1994). Other papers point out the benefits of openness that accrue through
the specialization of countries when production technologies exhibit increasing returns
to scale (Romer, 1987) or when countries are in different stages of their economic
development (Barro, Mankiw and Sala-I-Martin, 1995).
However, whether a country opens its borders to foreign capital or not depends
crucially on the incentives of the politicians who make the decision. Irrespectively of
the potential benefits that such a decision may generate to the rest of the economy, if
politicians’ objective is to maximize their own utility, then it is not clear that financial
openness will occur. Until recently, economic literature has ignored the political aspects
of capital account liberalization, apart from some rare exceptions (for instance, see
Alesina and Tabellini, 1989).
The purpose of this paper is to provide a political economy view of financial open-
ness, by examining the incentives of politicians to open up capital markets under condi-
tions which favor political rents. First, we introduce a symmetric political competition
voting game in a closed economy, where voters exhibit a certain degree of ideological
adherence to one of the two politicians (alternatively, politicians can be viewed as po-
litical parties) and each political contestant is required to achieve some form of super
majority in order to win the election. Politicians in governmental positions can in-
fluence the decisions of financial institutions, such as banks, on how to allocate funds
between good and bad projects. Good projects produce higher observable output than
bad projects. If a part of the funds is provided to the latter form of investment, they
extract some political rents (which we refer to as corruption bribes) 1.
We assume that politicians are selfish, in the sense that they care only about being
elected and the amount of bribes they receive. They make political proposals to voters
regarding taxation, which will be used to cover the potential losses of financial institu-
tions, and the distribution of funds between types of projects. Under these conditions,
1For simplicity, in this paper we allow only entrepreneurs with bad projects to bribe politicians.
Alternatively, we could allow both types of entrepreneurs to bribe politicians, but projects differ in
terms of transparency. For transparent projects output is fully verifiable at zero cost, whereas for
opaque projects only a part of output can be verified costlessly. This verifiable part of the output of
opaque projects is not enough to cover the cost of investment. As a result, transparent projects can
receive financing from private banks, whereas opaque projects cannot. Politicians channel the funds of
state-owned banks to opaque projects, they tax transparent projects to cover the resulting losses and
use the power of the state (institutions under their control) to extract part of the non-verifiable output
(bribes to politicians). If the non-verifiable part of the output of opaque projects the politicians can
extract exceeds the net present value of transparent projects then we can obtain the same qualitative
results as in this paper. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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we derive the equilibrium of the voting game and show the implications of political
frictions for corruption.
Subsequently, we generalize the model to the case where politicians can also make
offers on the degree of financial openness of the economy, so that good projects can
receive foreign capital for investment. We derive the political equilibrium of the ex-
tended game and show how financial openness and corruption are causally related to
political frictions. An important finding of our modeling approach is that the relation-
ship between financial openness and corruption is not monotonic. More specifically,
the sign of the correlation between corruption and financial openness depends on the
degree of investor protection. If a country has well functioning institutions of investor
protection, then financial openness is positively related to political frictions. If, on the
other hand, a country has weak investor protection institutions, then openness and
political frictions are negatively related. Therefore our model provides an explanation
for why empirical studies can not find a robust relationship between financial openness
and corruption.
From a theoretical standpoint, there are few papers directly related to our approach.
Alesina and Tabellini (1989) were among the first researchers who tried to explain cap-
ital mobility through a political economy approach. Their model concerns an economy
where there are two types of government, one favoring policies that increase the returns
to labor and the other favoring policies that increase the return to capital. The two
governments alternate in power, which generates political uncertainty and induces a
partial flight of capital abroad. This is a useful approach to explain events of capital
flight, however, their model can not be used for explaining foreign investment or its
relation to corruption levels in the economy.
Inclan and Quinn (1997) also relate the policies that political parties employ to the
interests of the socioeconomic groups that support them. They differentiate parties to
left wing and right wing and assume that either type of party may favor capital account
liberalization depending on the effects of such policies to the income of the groups that
support them. For instance, in countries where skilled labor abounds they claim that left
wing parties will generally favor financial liberalization. However, their theory treats
political contestants as agents of specific social groups and it is not concerned with
the reasons behind politicians decision to express the interests of one social group over
another. In contrast, we place more emphasis on the economic conditions which align
political incentives with the interests of particular social groups and their repercussions
on the political decision of financial openness.
Another paper that adopts a political economy approach is Aizenman and Noy
(2003). In their paper, a benevolent government tries to raise the necessary funds in
order to finance a specific level of public good expenditure by either taxing income or by
taxing agents’ endowment of capital. Both methods of taxation are costly in their own
ways. Income taxation implies collection costs while capital taxation induces capital
flight and restrictions to financial openness. In turn, agents will try to bypass these
restrictions by misvoicing of exporting goods and bribing customs officials. As a result,
countries with very inefficient tax collection systems will generally exhibit low levels of
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financial openness and high levels of corruption. Aizenman (2004) goes one step further
by associating trade openness with financial openness and by claiming that as the
degree of trade openness increases for an economy, exporting goods misvoicing becomes
easier and financial restrictions less efficient for tax collection purposes. Therefore,
financial openness should be positively correlated with trade openness. In contrast, in
our model, financial openness implies capital inflows but not capital outflows. Capital
markets are assumed to be competitive and so outside investors are making zero profits
in equilibrium. As a result, the imposition of taxes has no effect on outside investors
and does not give rise to capital flights 2. Our notion of corruption is also different.
While corruption in the Aizenman and Noy model reflects bribes to public servants,
our model views corruption as the rents that politicians themselves receive from their
political activities.
From an empirical point of view, our model is also related to a wide range of pa-
pers. There is an extensive literature which tries to assess the empirical relationship
between financial openness and corruption, with ambiguous results. Studies by Wei
(1999), Larrain and Tavares (2000), Drabek and Payne (2001), Edison, Levine, Ricci
and Sløk (2002) and Dreher and Siemers (2005) report the existence of a negative cor-
relation between corruption levels and financial openness. On the other hand, studies
by Wheeler and Mody (1992), Alesina and Weder (1999) and Gatti (2004) do not find
any statistical significant relationship between the two variables.
For example, Larrain and Tavares (2000) try to relate levels of trade and financial
openness to corruption. They find a statistically significant negative relationship be-
tween trade and corruption, as they also do for foreign direct investment as a percentage
of GDP. In a similar study, however, Gatti (2004) does not find any robust correlation
between capital mobility and corruption, despite finding a negative correlation when
examining the effects of trade. This is a characteristic case of the dichotomy of the
literature on this issue.
Our model is capable of providing a framework that explains the inability of empir-
ical literature to find a robust result. According to our model, financial openness and
corruption are both indirectly related to political and institutional features of the econ-
omy. Therefore, whether corruption appears to be positively or negatively correlated
with capital mobility depends on other variables as well (political frictions, degree of
investor protection). Under our framework, both types of correlation are possible and
this can explain why empirical studies disagree.
Our model is consistent with other empirical observations, as well. Mauro (1995)
finds a statistically significant negative relationship between corruption and growth
rates. In our voting game, higher ideological adherence gives higher ability to politi-
cians to manipulate sources of finance toward bad projects and bribes for themselves.
2However, taxes affect entrepreneurs and so entrepreneurs have an incentive to move to countries
with lower tax rates, provided that the relocation costs are zero. We assume that these relocation costs
are sufficiently high so that moving to another country is not a profitable choice. This is particularly
relevant for firms whose production is intensive in immobile factors of production. The formalization
of this argument is available from the authors upon request.
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Therefore, higher corruption may be associated with lower levels of observable output.
If we were to extend our model to a multi-period setting, then lower output would have
adverse effects to income growth, so that we would replicate Mauro’s results.
Alfaro and Charlton (2007) explore the effects of international financial integration
to countries’ entrepreneurial activity and find a positive and statistically significant
relationship between the two under various proxies for entrepreneurship. Furthermore,
they find that the industries, which exhibit the greatest increase in their activities, are
the ones which receive the greatest share of foreign capital. Our model is consistent
with this observation, as it directly relates financial openness to the funding of domestic
projects and the financial constraints of a closed economy.
Finally, our model has two predictions which have not been tested so far. First, the
relationship between financial openness and government size which, according to our
model, is positive. Second, the relationship between frictions to political competition
and openness. Our model suggests that if a country has well functioning institutions
of investor protection, then financial openness is positively related to political frictions.
If, on the other hand, a country has weak investor protection institutions, then open-
ness and political frictions are negatively related. Key political variables like electoral
systems or political polarization may be required in studies which examine the impact
of corruption to economic variables.
In section 2 we provide a simple symmetric model of a voting game between two
political parties in a closed economy. We derive the Nash equilibrium of the game under
political competition. Section 3 generalizes the model, by allowing political contestants
to make offers on the degree of financial openness. We once more derive the Nash
equilibrium in terms of the main variables and provide some comparative statics in order
to clarify the causal relationship between political frictions and corruption, financial
openness or government size. Section 4 makes some brief comments and concludes.
2 Political Competition in a Closed Economy
The economy is assumed to last for a single period and consists of two basic categories
of agents. On one hand, there is a series of entrepreneurs, whose projects differ with
respect to their productivity. At the same time these entrepreneurs vote for the politi-
cian they prefer to be in power and his respective policy. On the other hand, there is a
group of politicians, who propose several political measures and compete to get elected
and receive the power-related benefits. Entrepreneurs have different preferred policies,
according to their productivity, and different degrees of ideological adherence to a cer-
tain politician or political party, which allows for inefficient policies to be implemented
and a certain degree of corruption to pertain in the economy. The timing of the model
is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Timing of events
Entrepreneurs and Banks
There is a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs in the interval [0,1] , who are dis-
tinguished into types by the quality of the project they have. There exist 2 types of
entrepreneurs, those with high quality (or good) projects (αH), who amount for a frac-
tion q of the total population, and those with low quality (bad) projects (αL) and a
fraction (1-q). Each one of them requires an amount I of funds to start up his project,
which will yield with certainty either αHI or αLI after 1 period, depending on the type
of project. We assume that αH > 1 > αL. The quality of the project is publicly known
and verifiable without any cost. Furthermore, by running the project the entrepreneur
receives an unobserved, private benefit b, which has been deducted in the calculation
of the net project-returns αHI and αLI.
Let λ denote the fraction of projects that can be undertaken by the available funds
(0 < λ 6 q). These funds are provided to the entrepreneurs through state-owned
banks, which do not operate exclusively under economic criteria, but are also prone to
pressures by the political party in power. Therefore the provision of funds for all good
projects is not guaranteed, since politicians have an incentive to channel a part of the
funds to low quality projects, from which they receive bribes (as long as λ < q).
If a bad project receives funds, after one period the entrepreneur will repay back
to the bank an amount rLI, which is determined by the politician, while the residual
return from the project (β = αL− rL) is repaid to the politician as a bribe. This means
that if some bad projects receive funds, banks cannot recover the full amount of loans
they provide to them and alternative means of financing are required through either
taxation or higher repayment rates on good quality firms’ profits. Since the politicians
ultimately have the power to extract profits from high quality entrepreneurs through
taxation, they allow public banks to compete with each other for high quality projects,
which drives high quality projects’ repayment equal to I, and use taxation as the sole
means of rent extraction.
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Politicians
There are 2 political players in this economy, P1 and P2, who can be interpreted as
major political parties or more accurately as key politicians. These 2 vie for the control
of the government. At the beginning of the period each one of them makes a public
proposal of his intended policies to the set of voters, who according to their preferences
choose who will govern. Once in government the elected politician has the power to
set taxation for firms and the ability to exert influence over the decisions of the public
banks on how to distribute the available funds for investment. If a certain level of funds
is provided to bad projects in exchange for political support, then taxation is needed
to cover the losses of banks.
The extent to which a politician can manipulate internal funds depends on the
restrictions on the mismanagement of state-owned banks and his ability to remain in
power despite these events. The assumption we maintain throughout the rest of the
paper is that the politician has full discretion on how to allocate the available funds to
the two types of projects. This means that the politician can only take decisions that do
not lead state-owned banks to bankruptcy and this is a constraint he cannot manipulate.
In addition, politicians have the power to bargain with low quality entrepreneurs on
how the returns from their projects will be allocated between repayment to banks (rL)
and direct transfers to politicians (corruption bribes:β).
On the other hand, another set of restrictions is implicitly imposed by political
competition and the fact that a pure predatory behavior from the politician’s part is
unlikely to win him the election. More specifically, before the election takes place the
two politicians publicly announce the set of politically controlled variables, namely the
profit tax rate (t) and the number of good projects (sH) that will be funded. We denote
the political proposal by politician Pi as: P
R
i = {ti, siH}
An implicit element of the proposal is the level of funds the politician appropriates
from each low quality entrepreneur (βiI), which can be considered as a political bribe
or a reward for the politician for allowing bad projects to operate. This is never part
of the public announcement but, given the proposal and the information structure of
the environment, agents are able to infer the amount of proposed corruption as well as
the repayment rate for bad projects (rL) and the amount of low quality entrepreneurs
who will receive funds (sL). The total level of corruption in the economy is the bribe
received from each low quality entrepreneur times the number of low quality firms
receiving funds: B = βsLI.
In this framework we assume that political announcements are credible and that
there are no commitment issues. Once in office, the politician implements his prede-
termined policy or otherwise he is thrown out of power and the other politician takes
over 3.
3We could alternatively obtain the same qualitative results by setting up a dynamic model with
reputation effects and politicians competing for power given their credibility. This would give a more
rigorous argument on why policies may be considered credible, but it would make the analysis much
more complex and mathematically demanding.
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Entrepreneurs as Voters
Entrepreneurs vote for their preferred candidate based on the expected utility they
will derive from his policies and their ideological adherence. Each politician represents
a specific ideology (ideology i for Pi and ideology j for Pj, which are fixed for each
politician), while voters have individual tastes which we assume that are uniformly
distributed over the interval [−M,M ] within each group of types of entrepreneurs. M
shows the degree of adherence to the ideology i, or, in other words, it is the relative
likeness or antipathy that an agent has to ideology i over j. We let the variable dik
denote the relative preference of agent k (k = {h, l}) for ideology i. By definition the
following equations hold:
dih ∼ Uni[−M,M ]
dil ∼ Uni[−M,M ]
dik = −djk
where the subscripts h and l denote an entrepreneur of a high or low quality project
respectively.
The following figure shows the distribution of preferences for ideology i within each
type of voters:
Figure 2: Ideological Distribution
We assume that the utility of a voter, conditional on his type, his ideological profile
and the policy proposition of party i, is simply the sum of the utility of expected profit
and of his ideological adherence:
Uk(P
R
i ) = E(pi(P
R
i )) +
dik
2
For each type of agent utility can be written as:
Uh(P
R
i ) =
siH
q
[(αH − 1− ti)I + b] + d
i
h
2
(1)
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Ul(P
R
i ) =
siL
1− q b+
dil
2
(2)
The first multiplicative term is the probability of an entrepreneur to undertake the
project under the proposed policy and the second term is the income he would receive
in that case. The last term corresponds to the utility gain attached to ideological voting.
From the above equations and the fact that dik = −djk follows that an agent will
vote for politician Pi (denoted as: v
i
k = 1) iff:
Uk(P
R
i ) > Uk(P
R
j )⇔ E(pik(PRi ))− E(pik(PRj )) + dik > 0 (3)
Elections and Politicians
Let V i be the total votes that Pi receives. In order to win the election we assume that
the politician must receive a critical mass of  votes more than his competitor, where
 can be an interval arbitrarily small. If Pi receives less votes than Pj by a difference
at least as large as  then he loses the election, while if the difference is less than this
threshold, he loses the election with only a probability equal to 1
2
. The election rule is
then specified as:
piwin = 1, if V
i − V j > 
piwin =
1
2
, if − < V i − V j <  and
piwin = 0, if V
i − V j 6 −
The critical mass of voters  is an important parameter of the problem at study. It
reflects the necessary majority in the society for the formation of a politically stable gov-
ernment. Higher values of this parameter mean that politicians need a higher majority
to secure election and distort their proposals toward more rent seeking policies.
Given the above specifications of the economy, politicians try to maximize their
expected wealth, which consists of the appropriated part of the low projects returns:
maxUp(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = p
i
winB
γ
i
where γ is the coefficient of risk aversion for politicians (0 6 γ 6 1). Politicians
essentially try to maximize the expected appropriation of funds under the limitations
that they have been imposed to them:
–the allocation of funds condition: (
siH + s
i
L
)
I 6 λI (4)
(the available funds for investment can either be invested in good projects or bad
ones)
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–the allocation of bad projects’ returns:
βi + r
i
L 6 αL (5)
–the profitability of public banks condition:
rLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI −B > λI (6)
(the sum of the repayments by bad and good projects and aggregate taxation
must be at least equal to the initial funds available for investment)
–the Election Rule and the commitment of execution of proposed policies.
In terms of mathematical expressions, each candidate tries to solve the following
problem (P.1):
max
siH ,s
i
L,ti,βi,r
i
L
Up(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = p
i
winB
γ
i s.t.
Bi = βis
i
LI
(siH + s
i
L) I 6 λI
βi + r
i
L 6 αL
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI > λI
0 6 ti 6 αH − 1
piwin = 1, if V
i − V j > , piwin = 12 , if − 6 V i − V j 6 , piwin = 0, if V i − V j 6 −
Political Equilibrium
We now analyze the equilibrium of the political game described above. The power
of politicians is not unchecked, but subject to the constraints imposed by political
competition and the election rule. If a politician tries to maximize his own wellbeing,
as a dictator would do, then he will be undercut by his competitor, who will offer a
more attractive option to voters and will win the election.
But winning the election is costly itself. If the two politicians make exactly the
same political proposal to voters then none of them would win with certainty. Since
ideological dispersion is symmetric by assumption, half of the agents would vote for
either politician. We call the set of voters who vote for one politician over another,
when both of them offer the same proposal, as the natural support group, because of
their exogenous ideological preference.
If a rival wants to win the election with certainty, a required mass of  voters is
required and these voters have already a certain degree of ideological adherence to
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the other candidate. In order to win their votes a politician will have to offer greater
concessions to them in terms of political proposal than what he would have offered
to his own supporters and this cost is increasing in relative terms as the concessions
required for election victory increase. Therefore there is a cut-off point, which makes
politicians indifferent between winning elections or sticking to their support group and
taking over power with probability 1
2
. Given the above intuition, the rest of this section
is focused on providing a diagrammatic and analytical exposition of the solution of the
political game and the main arguments behind the results.
First, we try to describe the set of political proposals for politician Pi, which win
him the election for a specific proposal by Pj and then compare the utility from win-
ning an election with the utility from playing the same strategy as the opponent and
winning with probability 1
2
. Essentially, the political contestants have 2 different strate-
gies. They can either try to win the election, which implies a relative benefit from the
certainty of rising to power and a relative cost in terms of higher concessions to voters,
or they can mimic their opponent in terms of proposal and wait for luck to determine
who gets the power.
If a politician mimics his opponent, then he will receive 1−q
2
votes from entrepreneurs
with low quality projects and q
2
votes from entrepreneurs with high quality projects, for
a total of 1
2
. If, on the other hand, Pi deviates, he requires at least
1+
2
votes to win the
election 4. The amount of extra low quality voters he will receive from such a deviation
(which can also be negative) is:
(siL−s
j
L
)b
1−q
M
1−q
2
.
(siL−sjL)b
1−q denotes the excess monetary utility low quality entrepreneurs will receive
by Pi’s proposal and when divided by M it denotes the proportion of inefficient en-
trepreneurs for whom the differential monetary utility exceeds their ideological adher-
ence. Of course, in order to be consistent, we assume that −M 6 (siL−s
j
L)b
1−q 6 M since
the fraction of the two values can not exceed 1. (1−q)
2
is the amount of voters who can
be attracted from or lost to the opponent. The total expression can be rewritten as
(siL−sjL)b
2M
and, by including the natural supporters, the total number of bad type voters is:
V il (P
R
i , P
R
j ) =
(1− q)
2
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
Similarly the amount of extra high quality voters a politician can receive by PRi 6= PRj
is
siH [(αH−1−ti)I+b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH−1−tj)I+b]
2M
, while the total number of good type voters is:
V ih(P
R
i , P
R
j ) =
q
2
+
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
4Recall that if i receives an number of 2 extra votes by changing his proposal, his opponent loses
these votes, so that the total vote difference is equal to 
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All this implies that the total support politician Pi should expect is equal to:
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) =
1
2
+
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
If he were to win, then the following condition should be satisfied:
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) =
1
2
+
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
−s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
> 1 + 
2
(7)
Essentially, if the politician were to win the election he should solve the modified
problem P.1 with the addition of condition (7)(problem P.1b):
max
siH ,s
i
L,ti,βi,r
i
L
Up(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = B
γ
i s.t.
Bi = βis
i
LI
(siH + s
i
L) I 6 λI
βi + r
i
L 6 αL
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI > λI
siH [(αH−1−ti)I+b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH−1−tj)I+b]
2M
+
(siL−sjL)b
2M
> 
2
−M 6 (siL−s
j
L)b
1−q 6M
−M 6 siH [(αH−1−ti)I+b]
q
− s
j
H [(αH−1−tj)I+b]
q
6M
0 6 ti 6 αH − 1
The solution to this problem is provided below5:
β˜ = αL, r˜L = 0, t˜i =
αHλI
λI+M+sjH(αH−1−tj)I
− 1,
5The derivation of the solution is provided in Appendix A.
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s˜iL =
λ(αH−1)I−(M+sjH(αH−1−tj)I)
αHI
s˜iH =
λI+M+sjH(αH−1−tj)I
αHI
The above variables comprise the elements of the politician’s proposal which, given
his opponent’s proposal, maximize his utility under the condition that he wins the elec-
tion with certainty. We denote this proposal as P˜Ri . The associated utility level from
this proposal is expressed as:
U˜p = B˜
γ
i =
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I
)]γ
The above expression is very intuitive. The first term is the utility the politician
would get if he were a dictator. The second term reflects the utility loss the politician
must suffer in order to win the election and it is decreasing in sjH . The more funds
Pj provides to good projects, and hence the less corrupt he is, the greater are the
concessions Pi has to make to secure victory.
This is not his best response function however. The politician might do better by
mimicking his opponent’s proposal and not suffering the cost of higher concessions to
voters. In order to verify if this is the case, the politician needs also to solve P.1 under
the slightly modified condition:
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) =
1
2
⇔ 1
2
+
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
−s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
=
1
2
Of course, the above condition implies that: siH = s
j
H , s
i
L = s
j
L, ti = tj which means
that Pi mimics Pj’s proposal. In that case Pi’s utility would be:
Up =
1
2
Bγi =
1
2
(βis
i
LI)
γ =
1
2
(αLs
j
LI)
γ 6
Therefore, Pi prefers to win the election with probability
1
2
to a certain victory if
and only if:
Up > U˜p ⇔ 1
2
(αLs
j
LI)
γ >
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I
)]γ
6It is very easy to verify that if Pi mimics his opponent then his best response is to set βi = αL, by
following exactly the same method as we did in the Appendix A for the case of pure election victory.
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⇔ sjL 6
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ − 1
)
αHI
7
The above condition sets a critical level for the strategies Pi will play. If his opponent
chooses sjL above this value, then Pi prefers to compete aggressively and win the election,
while if it is below this value then he prefers to make exactly the same proposal as the
other politician and at least get 1
2
chance of gaining power. But he would never opt for
high values of corruption and lose all chances of being elected, since, by the assumptions
of the model, the only way he can gain some utility is through the potential bribes that
come along with power.
Because of the symmetry of the political game, of course, Pj faces a similar condition
and the same strategic issues:
siL 6
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ − 1
)
αHI
Hence, the unique equilibrium of the game is:
siL = s
j
L =
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ − 1
)
αHI
The two politicians mimic each other’s proposals and chance determines who gets
the power. If one of them deviates from this equilibrium and increases taxation by
even an infinitesimal amount, the other one can do better by decreasing it and winning
election for sure. On other hand, none of them has an incentive to decrease the level
of funds that goes to low quality projects as winning the election with certainty, in
this case, lowers the politician’s utility when compared with the utility level he derives
by mimicking his opponent’s proposal. Therefore the symmetric equilibrium of this
political game can be fully described as:
βi = βj = αL, r
i
L = r
j
L = 0, s
i
L = s
j
L =
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ −1
)
αHI
,
siH = s
j
H = λ− 2
1
γM(
2
1
γ −1
)
αHI
, ti = tj =
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ −1
)
αHλI−2
1
γM
The equilibrium utility level politicians receive is:
U∗p =
1
2
[
2
1
γ
2
1
γ − 1
αL
αH
M
]γ
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Figure 3: Political Equilibria under Monopoly and Competition
The equilibrium is also represented diagrammatically in the figure 3. It is drawn
in the {t, sL} space and utility increases for the politician as t and sL increase. The
sL =
λt
1+t
curve corresponds to the level of low quality projects that can be undertaken
as a function of the tax rate when the condition β = αL holds. It represents the
profitability of banks condition (6) and shows the maximum number of low quality
projects that can be financed for each level of taxation so that public banks do not go
bankrupt.
Point A stands for the autocratic case, when the politician faces no challenges to
his power and hence he can set the maximum possible tax in order to fund as many
low quality projects as possible and reap the maximum level of bribes 8. On the other
hand, point B in the diagram shows the case of political competition. Due to the fear
of losing the election, politicians must provide some concessions to voters in terms of
lower corruption.
However, the level of corruption that will prevail in the economy depends on the
degree of ideological adherence and the necessary majority to consolidate power. So long
as M and  are sufficiently small, the cost of undermining a political opponent remains
less than the benefit of winning the election and political competition has a bite on
lowering the expropriating power of politicians. Specifically, a necessary condition for
lower corruption under political competition than the autocratic case is:
7The derivation of this inequality is included in Appendix A.
8See Appendix C for a detailed analysis of this case.
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s∗L 6 smL ⇔
2
1
γM(
2
1
γ − 1
)
αHI
6 λ(αH − 1)
αH
⇔M 6
(
2
1
γ − 1
)
λ(αH − 1)I
2
1
γ
(8)
The left hand side of (8) represents the cost the politician must suffer in order to
win the election, while the right side is the perceived benefit: the total profits that
would be generated in the economy if all good projects were undertaken weighted by
the increase in probability of winning the election and the degree of risk aversion of the
politician 9.
In other words, the greater the degree of ideological adherence of voters to their
preferred politician the more difficult it is for his opponent to attract away the necessary
mass of supporters, and hence the greater the de facto power of the politician to set his
policy closer to his most preferred choice. For the same reason, the higher the necessary
mass of voters for an election victory the more inefficient political proposals become.
If  = 0 or M = 0, then attracting voters is unnecessary or costless for political
victory so that there is perfect political competition, which implies that only good
projects receive funds and politicians obtain no bribes. On the other hand, if condition
(8) is violated, then essentially the cost of political competition is so high that politicians
can act as monopolists (dictators). In other words, economies with higher degree of
polarization or greater political instability, which require increased majorities for the
implementation of power, give greater power to politicians to act according to their
best interest and face the risk of higher corruption.
Finally, the degree of risk aversion of the politician works against rent seeking poli-
cies. The more risk averse the politicians are the more they seek to secure victory in
elections and hence the tougher the political competition. As a result, the number
of bad projects funded and the implied level of corruption decrease on their political
proposals.
3 Political Competition and Financial Openness
Up to this point our model was concerned with a closed economy with limited funds,
so that not all projects could be undertaken. In this section we allow the politicians
to incorporate on their campaign proposals a degree of financial openness, so that they
can relax the financial constraint of the economy.
The degree of financial openness is captured by the variable µ, which denotes the
mass of domestic firms that receive funding from external investors. These inflows can
be interpreted as either funds provided by foreign private banks or foreign direct invest-
ment. What matters for the economic analysis is that the foreign financial institutions
9Notice that if γ = 1, then
(
2
1
γ −1
)
2
1
γ
= 12 .
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face perfect competition and allocate capital solely on economically based criteria, so
that only good projects receive funds and they repay back the initial capital I to foreign
investors 10.
Opening up the economy is beneficial for the politicians as well, since it relaxes the
internal funding constraint they face. As more efficient type projects can now be un-
dertaken, politicians can receive higher tax revenues, which they can channel through
public banks to bad projects and themselves. The financial openness version of the
politicians’ problem is (P.2):
max
siH ,s
i
L,ti,βi,r
i
L,µi
Up(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = p
i
winB
γ
i s.t.
Bi = βis
i
LI
(siH + s
i
L) I 6 λI
siH + µi 6 q
βi + r
i
L 6 αL
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + ti(s
i
H + µi)I > λI
0 6 ti 6 αH − 1
piwin = 1, if V
i − V j > , piwin = 12 , if − 6 V i − V j 6 , piwin = 0, if V i − V j 6 −
This problem is almost identical to the one in section 1. The only difference is the
addition of one extra condition which captures the fact that the total funds provided
for good projects can not exceed the funds required by them. This condition, however,
will hold with equality in equilibrium, as it is always a best response for a politician to
allow for all good projects in the economy to be undertaken, no matter what strategy
the other candidate follows. In all other aspects the structure of the model is identical.
Politicians will either go for an aggressive strategy or choose to mimic their opponent
in order to draw the election, depending on their payoff and the strategy of the other
10In our model, financial openness implies capital inflows but not capital outflows. Capital markets
are assumed to be competitive and so outside investors are making zero profits in equilibrium. As
a result, the imposition of taxes has no effect on outside investors and does not give rise to capital
flights. However, taxes do affect entrepreneurs and so entrepreneurs have an incentive to move to
countries with lower tax rates, provided that the relocation costs are zero. Here, we assume that these
relocation costs are sufficiently high so that moving to another country is not a profitable choice. This
is particularly relevant for firms whose production is intensive in immobile factors of production. The
formalization of this argument is available from the authors upon request.
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politician. The total number of votes a politician receives in this case is given by:
V i(PRi , P
R
j ) =
1
2
+
(siH + µi)[(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
−(s
j
H + µj)[(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
The difference with the equivalent condition of section 1 is that, under financial
openness, the possibility for a high quality entrepreneur to receive funds is increased
by the proposed extent of capital inflows relative to the total number of high quality
projects. This is reflected in his voting behavior by making it more likely to vote for
the politician who favors financial openness most. In fact, given the previous argument,
the probability of the high-quality entrepreneur to receive funds is one for both political
proposals.
The political game described above exhibits two possible equilibria, depending on
the sign of a single condition.
Case 1: b < (1− αL)I
This is the case when the political cost from gaining a vote from a low-quality en-
trepreneur is greater than the political benefit. Recall that b stands for the unverifiable
private benefit that the entrepreneur receives when the project is undertaken. On the
other hand the right hand side represents the cost to good firms and society due to the
losses and the increase in taxation caused by the financing of a bad project.
When b is smaller than (1 − αL)I, the incremental social benefit, received by the
low-quality entrepreneur, is lower than the incremental social cost of the loss of valuable
resources, so that bad projects should not be undertaken at all. Politicians partially
materialize this social preference through the cost on their political proposals. The
compensation they need to provide to their voters with good projects is greater than
their political benefit, so that politicians try to minimize the degree their policies appeal
to low quality entrepreneurs.
Politicians will prefer to directly compete as long as 11:
sL >
2
1
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) M
(I − b) (9)
Let Φ = 2
1
γ(
2
1
γ −1
) . The equilibrium of the game has the same interpretation as in
section 1 and it is characterized by:
11See Appendix B
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siL = s
j
L =
ΦM
(I − b) , βi = βj = αL, r
i
L = r
j
L = 0, s
i
H = s
j
H = λ−
ΦM
(I − b)
µi = µj = q − λ+ ΦM
(I − b) , ti = tj =
ΦM
q(I − b)
Case 2: b > (1− αL)I
Under this condition, the political benefit of financing a low quality project is greater
than its political cost. The result in terms of political competition is that politicians
make proposals containing high levels of low quality funding in order to win the election.
In other words, under the condition b > (1−αL)I, the most cost efficient way of gaining
political support is through a populist political platform, which promises very generous
funding to entrepreneurs with bad projects. This is because low quality entrepreneurs
are those who value the funding the most. The political competition condition is now
expressed by 12:
sL 6
q(αH − 1)
(1− αL) −
ΦM
b
(10)
The first term on the right hand side represents the gains generated by financing all
good projects in the economy while the second term the concessions the politician needs
to offer to low-quality entrepreneurs in order to win the election. As long as the number
of bad projects proposed by the opponent of politician Pi is below this value, Pi can
secure election victory and increase his utility by increasing taxation, subsidizing public
banks and allowing for more bad projects to be undertaken. If, on the other hand, Pj
makes a proposal above the threshold value of equation (10), P ′is best response is to
decrease the funding of bad projects by a little bit less than M
b
. This will allow him to
increase the level of bribes he is receiving, without decreasing his chances of winning
the election and therefore strictly improves his utility. Hence, the political equilibrium
of the game in this case is attained when both politicians propose:
sjL
∗
= siL
∗
=
q(αH − 1)
(1− αL) −
ΦM
b
The equilibrium values for the rest of the variables are:
12See Appendix B
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β∗ =
(1− αL)2ΦM
(αH − 1)qb− (1− αL)ΦM, r
∗
L = αL−β∗, t∗ = αH−1, s∗H = λ−s∗L, µ∗ = q−λ+s∗L
As we have already noted, because the incremental social value of an bad project
exceeds its social cost, political competition is distorted toward low quality funding and
greater corruption. This was not the case in section 1, where the limitation of available
funds guaranteed that the marginal social value of an bad project was always less than
the social cost, because a high quality entrepreneur lost the opportunity to fund its
project. In other words, financial openness allows all high quality entrepreneurs to
receive the private benefit of running the project so that the only social cost of a low
quality project is the destruction of resources through its operation. This means that
financial openness may increase or decrease the relative corruption levels in an economy,
depending on the level of private benefits that accrue to low quality entrepreneurs and
the bargaining power of politicians.
Finally, it is important to note that the distinction between the two different equi-
libria of the game may give an indication why some societies face greater corruption
problems than others. Notice that the condition, which creates the distinction between
cases 1 and 2 and which determines the pervasiveness of corruption in an economy, is
more likely to hold (for case 2) when the ratio b
I
is higher. In other words, the higher
the private benefits of running a project or the lower the required level of investment
for that project, the more likely it is for an economy to be on the high corruption
equilibrium. If the level of private unobservable benefits that accrue from a project are
negatively related to the degree of development of its financial and investor protection
systems and if the level of investment required increases along with the growth of the
economy, then the model may be in position to explain why developed economies have
lower levels of corruption.
Political Frictions and Financial Openness
In equilibrium, the degree of financial openness of the economy is defined as the aggre-
gate capital inflows as a percentage of GDP and it is expressed as a function of political
frictions, M. The following equations provide the formulae for the two different regimes
of the model:
Case 1:
µ∗I
GDP
=
q − λ+ sL
(αh − 1)q + λ− (1− αL)sL =
(q − λ)(I − b) + ΦM
[(αH − 1)q + λ] (I − b)− (1− αl)ΦM
(11)
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Case 2:
µ∗I
GDP
=
q − λ+ sL
(αh − 1)q + λ− (1− αL)sL =
(αH − αL)qb− (1− αL)(λb+ ΦM)
(1− αL) [(1− αL)ΦM+ λb]
(12)
These equations propose interesting implications for empirical testing. First of all,
they imply that financial openness does not depend monotonically on political fric-
tions. Whether political frictions have positive or negative effects to financial openness
also depends on other parameters, like the private benefits of entrepreneurs, b, and the
verifiable part of output of low quality projects, αL.
If the private benefit of a low quality entrepreneur is lower than the loss of investment
through his project, (b < (1− αL)I), then financial openness is an increasing function
of political frictions, while if the private benefit is greater than the loss of investment,
financial openness is a decreasing function of political frictions. Recall that by the term
political frictions we mean the degree of ideological adherence of voters and the super-
majority requirement of election. In terms of proxies for empirical testing, political
frictions can be viewed as the degree of polarization and the extra number of votes
the first party needs over the second in order to form a government (super-majority
requirement).
The model predicts that if a country has developed well-functioning institutions of
investor protection and governance, so that the fraction of private benefits over invest-
ment is relatively low, then greater political polarization and stronger super-majority
requirement will positively affect financial openness. The opposite relationships will
hold for countries with relatively weak government institutions. Therefore, the model
generates some predictions which have not been tested empirically yet.
Government Size and Financial Openness
Our model provides has also empirical implications for the relationship between financial
openness and government size. Relative openness was defined in the previous section as
µI
GDP
. Government size is defined as: qt
GDP
, where the numerator represents the aggregate
taxation in the economy and the denominator is the summation of the present value of
all projects funded in the economy minus external funding (GDP = αLsLI +αHsHI −
µI).
The degree of openness and relative government size are positively correlated in our
model, because both of them are either positively or negatively correlated with political
frictions. More specifically, when equation (11) holds, an increase in political frictions
M increases the fraction of high quality projects financed by external investors, as
politicians finance a greater number of low quality projects. Hence relative financial
openness also goes up. At the same time, aggregate taxation goes up, while the GDP
of the economy goes down, as more low quality projects being financed implies lower
creation of domestic resources. Therefore, an increase in M is positively correlated
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with openness and government size.
On the other hand, when equation (12) holds, openness is negatively correlated with
political frictions. Also an increase in political frictions will decrease the relative size
of the government, because aggregate taxation will remain constant (see equilibrium
value t∗ under (12)), but the number of low quality projects that receive funds will
decrease and hence the GDP will increase. Therefore openness and government size
are positively correlated, as both will decrease if political frictions increase. Intuitively,
political rents are positively correlated with the size of the government and so politicians
have an incentive to increase the degree of openness of an economy, because this offers
them greater opportunities for appropriation of resources through bribes or corruption.
To the best of our knowledge, this prediction has not been tested empirically 13.
Relative Corruption and Financial Openness
The results of this section also allow us to check the conditions under which financial
openness facilitates the reduction of relative corruption in the economy. By relative
corruption we mean the total corruption bribe politicians receive divided by the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the economy. It is the share of observed output, which
politicians receive as rents. Let RCc denote the degree of relative corruption in a
financially closed economy. By using the equilibrium levels of the control variables of
the closed economy model, relative corruption can be expressed in terms of the main
parameters:
RCc =
βscLI
GDP c
=
βscLI
αLscLI + αHs
c
HI
⇔
RCc =
αLΦM
αLΦM+ αH(αHλI − ΦM) , where Φ =
2
1
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
)
If the economy is financially open, then we need to distinguish between the two
different cases presented earlier:
Case 1: If b < (1− αL)I then RCo = αLΦM[(αH−1)q+λ](I−b)−(1−αL)ΦM
Case 2: If b > (1− αL)I then RCo = (1−αL)ΦM(1−αL)ΦM+bλ
13The papers by Rodrik (1998) and Ram (2008) have found positive correlation between trade
openness and government size, but they do not test directly for the relationship between financial
openness and the government size.
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Comparing the relative corruption measures between the open and closed model of
the economy provides an indication of the factors that influence the effect of financial
openness to corruption levels. Whether relative corruption will be higher in a closed
economy than an open one (RCc > RCo), depends critically on the values of the model’s
parameters. We focus on two of them, which we consider of greater economic impor-
tance. The first is b, the private benefit of entrepreneurs, and the second is M, the
degree of political frictions, which affect politicians’ bargaining power. In each of the
cases described above, we rewrite the equation RCc = RCo so that it expresses b as a
function of M, assuming that the rest of the parameters remain constant. This allows
us to identify the range of values of the two variables for which relative corruption
increases when the economy opens to foreign capital. This is shown in the following
equations and in figure 4.
Case 1 : b =
(αH−1)qI−(1−α2H)λI
(αH−1)q+λ +
(αH−1)Φ
(αH−1)q+λM
Case 2 : b =
(1−αL)α2HI
αL
− αH(1−αL)Φ
αLλ
M
Figure 4: Relative Corruption and Financial Openness
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In figure 4, the b,{M} space is separated into 4 areas. Open economies have higher
ratios of political rents to GDP relative to closed economies in two of the four areas of
the graph. Irrespectively of the level of private benefits that accrue to entrepreneurs,
when the bargaining power of the politicians is weak (low levels of M) open economies
tend to favor relative corruption compared to closed economies. On the other hand, if
political frictions are high (high levels of M) then open economies exhibit less relative
corruption than closed ones.
In other words, political frictions play a major role in closed economies in determin-
ing corruption levels. If political frictions are very low, then politicians have almost no
ability to extract political rents so that when the economy opens the bargaining power
of politicians improves and relative corruption increases. If political frictions are very
high, however, politicians in a closed economy act completely unchecked and corruption
is in extremely high levels. Financial openness, in this case, has the opposite effect. It
decreases the bargaining power of politicians and reduces relative corruption. Never-
theless, it should be noted that in all the above cases absolute corruption increases so
that politicians always prefer to open up the economy rather than not.
The main implication is that corruption in an economy may be correlated to financial
openness either positively or negatively, depending also the level of political frictions,
the private benefit of the entrepreneur and the loss of investment by bad projects.
Generally, if political frictions are very low then corruption may be positively related
to financial openness. For intermediary ranges of political frictions the relationship
also depends on the functionality of political institutions. For relatively high levels of
frictions, openness and corruption are negatively correlated. These findings may explain
why empirical studies can not find a robust relationship between the two variables and
point out to other key variables that empirical tests can incorporate.
4 Conclusion
In the preceding sections we presented a simple model of political competition. The
model shows how ideological adherence of voters to specific candidates and super-
majority requirements for election victory give enough bargaining power to politicians to
receive positive political rents. Furthermore, if an economy faces financial restrictions,
politicians have an incentive to liberalize capital accounts, so that they can increase
income taxation and they receive more rents. Therefore, the model provides a political
economy theory of financial openness.
It also has some interesting empirical implications. First, it predicts that the rela-
tionship between financial openness and corruption is not necessarily positive or nega-
tive, but it depends on other economic and political variables, like the electoral system
or the degree investor protection. Hence, it can explain why recent economic studies
fail to find a robust relationship between the two variables. Furthermore, our model
is consistent with empirical studies, which report a negative effect of corruption levels
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on growth (Mauro, 1995) and a positive effect of financial openness on entrepreneurial
activity (Alfaro and Charlton, 2007).
The following two relationships have not been tested so far. First, the relationship
between financial openness and government size, which, according to our model, is pos-
itive. Second, the relationship between frictions to political competition and openness.
Our model suggests that if a country has well functioning institutions of investor pro-
tection, then financial openness is positively related to political frictions. If, on the
other hand, a country has weak investor protection institutions, then openness and po-
litical frictions are negatively related. In addition, key political variables like electoral
systems or political polarization may be required in studies which examine the impact
of corruption to economic variables.
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Appendix A
Solution to problem P.1b
Given that Pi wants to win the election with certainty, he solves the problem:
max
siH ,s
i
L,ti,βi,r
i
L
Up(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = B
γ
i (13)
s.t.
Bi = βis
i
LI (14)
(
siH + s
i
L
)
I 6 λI (15)
βi + r
i
L 6 αL (16)
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + tis
i
HI > λI (17)
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
> 
2
(18)
−M 6 (s
i
L − sjL)b
1− q 6M (19)
−M 6 s
i
H [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
q
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
q
6M (20)
0 6 ti 6 αH − 1 (21)
Constraints (15), (16), (17) and (18) of this maximization problem will hold with equal-
ity at the solution. Otherwise the politician can do better by changing one of the vari-
ables of the problem and receiving strictly higher utility. First, condition (18) can be
written:
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− s
j
H [(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
=

2
⇔
siH [(αH − 1− ti)I + b]− sjH [(αH − 1− tj)I + b] + (siL − sjL)b = M⇔
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siH(αH − 1− ti)I + siHb+ siLb = M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I + sjHb+ sjLb
But now notice that, since siHb+s
i
Lb = s
j
Hb+s
j
Lb = λb, the last equation is equivalent
to:
siH(αH − 1− ti)I = M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I (22)
Now let M(sjH , tj) = M
∗ = M + sjH(αH − 1 − tj)I. Since the politician can not
directly affect his opponents’ choice variables, they are considered as exogenous from
his point of view, so that M∗ is treated as a constant in his maximization problem. So:
siH(αH − 1− ti)I = M∗ (23)
By (15) and (23):
(λ− siL)(αH − 1− ti)I = M∗ ⇔ (λ− siL)(αH − 1)I − (λ− siL)tiI = M∗ ⇔
ti = αH − 1− M
∗
(λ− siL)I
(24)
Also, by substituting (15) and (16) into (17) and solving for βi we get the following
expression:
(αL − βi)siL + (1 + ti)(λ− siL) = λ⇔ αLsiL − βisiL + λ+ λti − (1 + ti)siL = λ⇔
λti + (αL − 1− ti)siL = βisiL ⇔ βi = (αL − 1− ti) +
λti
siL
(25)
and by (24):
βi =
(
αL − 1− αH + 1 + M
∗
(λ− siL)I
)
+
λ
(
αH − 1− M∗(λ−siL)I
)
siL
⇔
βi =
(αL − αH)(λ− siL)I +M∗
(λ− siL)I
+
λ
(αH−1)(λ−siL)I−M∗
(λ−siL)I
siL
⇔
βi =
(αL − αH)(λ− siL)IsiL +M∗siL
(λ− siL)IsiL
+
λ(αH − 1)(λ− siL)I − λM∗
(λ− siL)IsiL
⇔
βi = −(αH − αL) + λ(αH − 1)
siL
− M
∗
siLI
(26)
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Using equations (14) and (26) we substitute back to the objective function to rewrite
it as a function of only one choice variable:
max
siL
Bγi =
(
βis
i
LI
)γ
=
[(
−(αH − αL) + λ(αH − 1)
siL
− M
∗
siLI
)
siLI
]γ
= [−(αH − αL)siLI + (αH − 1)λI −M∗]γ
Since the objective function is monotonic in γ, the maximum of the above expression
is attained at the same level of siL as the maximum of Bi. The F.O.C. for this simpler
problem is:
∂Bi
∂siL
= −(αH − αL)I < 0, since αH > αL, I > 0
This implies that the politician must reduce siL as much as possible in order to
maximize his own utility, and this holds irrespectively of the political proposal of the
opponent. Notice that, by equation (26), as siL decreases βi increases (and also notice
that because ti > 0, it must hold that λ(αH − 1)I − M∗ > 0, by equation (24)).
Therefore, the minimum possible level for siL is the one that makes βi the maximum
possible. This implies that at the optimum βi = αL. By using equation (26) once more
we get the solution for siL:
αL = −(αH − αL) + λ(αH − 1)
siL
− M
∗
siLI
⇔ 0 = −αH + λ(αH − 1)I −M
∗
siLI
⇔
siL =
λ(αH − 1)I −M∗
αHI
(27)
And, by (24):
ti = αH − 1− M
∗
(λ− siL)I
⇔ ti = αH − 1− M
∗(
λ− λ(αH−1)I−M∗
αHI
)
I
⇔
ti = αH − 1− M
∗(
λαHI−λαHI+λI+M∗
αHI
)
I
⇔ ti = αH − 1− αHM
∗
λI +M∗
⇔
ti =
αHλI
λI +M∗
− 1 (28)
In order to complete the solution, note that βi = αL ⇒ rL = 0 and that:
siH = λ− siL ⇒ siH = λ−
λ(αH − 1)I −M∗
αHI
⇔ siH =
λI +M∗
αHI
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The utility the politician will derive by winning the elections as a response to his
opponent’s proposal is:
B˜γi = (βis
i
LI)
γ =
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
M∗
]γ
⇒
B˜γi =
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I
)]γ
If the politician decides to mimic he gets utility (see also the political equilibrium
section of the paper):
Up =
1
2
Bγi =
1
2
(βis
i
LI)
γ =
1
2
(αLs
j
LI)
γ
Politician decides not to pursue victory iff:
Up > U˜p ⇔ 1
2
(αLs
j
LI)
γ >
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ sjH(αH − 1− tj)I
)]γ ⇔
αLs
j
LI > 2
1
γ
[
αL(αH − 1)λI
αH
− αL
αH
(
M+ (λ− sjL)(αH − 1− tj)I
)]
At this point notice that, since the problem is symmetric, Pj will also set βj = αL
in order to maximize his utility irrespectively of what Pi will do and by equation (25)
we have:
αL = (αL − 1− tj) + λtj
sjL
⇔ 1 + tj = λtj
sjL
⇔ sjL = λtj − sjLtj ⇔ tj =
sjL
λ− sjL
(29)
We use this into the preceding expression:
sjLI > 2
1
γ
[
(αH − 1)λI
αH
− 1
αH
(
M+ (λ− sjL)
(
αH − 1− s
j
L
λ− sjL
)
I
)]
⇔
sjL > 2
1
γ
λ(αH − 1)
αH
− 2 1γ M
αHI
− 2 1γ λ(αH − 1)
αH
+ 2
1
γ
(αH − 1)
αH
sjL + 2
1
γ
1
αH
sjL ⇔
sjL > −2
1
γ
M
αHI
+ 2
1
γ sjL ⇔
(
1− 2 1γ
)
sjL > −2
1
γ
M
αHI
⇔
sjL 6
2
1
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) M
αHI
(30)
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Appendix B
Solution to problem P.2
The solution follows closely the steps of Appendix A.
Given that Pi wants to win the election with certainty, he solves the problem:
max
siH ,s
i
L,ti,βi,r
i
L,µi
Up(P
R
i , P
R
j ) = B
γ
i (31)
s.t.
Bi = βis
i
LI (32)
(
siH + s
i
L
)
I 6 λI (33)
siH + µi 6 q (34)
βi + r
i
L 6 αL (35)
riLs
i
LI + s
i
HI + ti(s
i
H + µi)I > λI (36)
(siH + µi)[(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− (s
j
H + µj)[(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
> 
2
(37)
−M 6 (s
i
L − sjL)b
1− q 6M (38)
−M 6 (s
i
H + µi)[(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
q
− (s
j
H + µj)[(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
q
6M (39)
0 6 ti 6 αH − 1 (40)
Given that restrictions (33)-(37) will be satisfied in equilibrium with equality, restriction
(37) rewrites:
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(siH + µi)[(αH − 1− ti)I + b]
2M
− (s
j
H + µj)[(αH − 1− tj)I + b]
2M
+
(siL − sjL)b
2M
=

2
⇔
q[(αH − 1− ti)I + b]− q[(αH − 1− tj)I + b] + (siL − sjL)b = M⇔
−qtiI + qtjI + siLb− sjLb = M⇔
−qtiI + siLb = M− qtjI + sjLb⇔
−qtiI + siLb = M∗ (41)
where : M∗ = M− qtjI + sjLb (42)
Solving for ti:
ti =
siLb−M∗
qI
(43)
Also, by constraints (33)-(36), we have:
αLs
i
L − βisiL + qti + λ− siL = λ⇔ βisiL = (αL − 1)siL + qti ⇔
βi = (αL − 1) + qti
siL
(44)
Substituting back (43) into (44):
βi = (αL − 1) +
q
siLb−M∗
qI
siL
⇔ βi = (αL − 1) + b
I
− M
∗
siLI
(45)
Hence:
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Bi = βis
i
LI ⇔ Bi =
[
(αL − 1) + b
I
− M
∗
siLI
]
siLI ⇔ Bi = (αL − 1)siLI + bsiL −M∗
∂Bi
∂siL
= (αL − 1)I + b 14
Case 1: ∂Bi
∂siL
< 0⇔ b < (1− αL)I
The politician maximizes his utility by setting siL to its minimum possible value. Since
βi is a negative function of s
i
L, by (44), the minimum value of the latter variable is
attained when βi reaches its maximum value, hence βi = αL. By (45), this implies
that:
M∗
siLI
= −1 + b
I
⇔ M
∗
siL
= b− I ⇔ siL =
M∗
b− I (46)
And by (43), it implies that:
siL = qti (47)
Also, the condition is symmetric for both politicians and irrespective of their strategy
so that sjL = qtj also holds. The utility of politician by winning the election is:
B˜γi =
(
β˜is˜iLI
)γ
=
(
αL
M∗
b− I I
)γ
=
(
αL
M− qtjI + sjLb
b− I I
)γ
⇔
B˜γi =
(
αL
M− sjLI + sjLb
b− I I
)γ
⇔ B˜γi =
(
αL
M+ sjL(b− I)
b− I I
)γ
(48)
If he were to mimic his opponent, instead, he would get utility equal to:
1
2
Bγi =
(
βis
i
LI
)γ
=
(
αLs
j
LI
)γ
(49)
14Recall, that because Up is monotonic in γ, finding the values of the control variables that maximize
it is equivalent to finding the values of the control variables that maximize Bi.
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The politician prefers to mimic his opponent iff:
Up > U˜p ⇔ 1
2
Bγi > B˜γi ⇔ Bi > 2
1
γ B˜i ⇔ αLsjLI > 2
1
γαL
M+ sjL(b− I)
b− I I ⇔
−2 1γ sjL + sjL > 2
1
γ
M
b− I ⇔ s
j
L 6
2
1
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) M
(I − b)
From the above inequality, we infer that the critical values for the politicians’ strate-
gies are:
sjL
∗
= siL
∗
=
2
1
γ(
2
1
γ − 1
) M
(I − b) (50)
The equilibrium of the game is described in section 2.
Case 2: ∂Bi
∂siL
> 0⇔ b > (1− αL)I
This is the opposite case. Politicians try to win the election by luring low quality
entrepreneurs to support them. In order to maximize their chances of winning, they
need to set the value of sL as high as possible. Since this is positively related to the
value of taxes in the economy (see also equation 43), siL reaches its maximum value
when ti = αH − 1 In fact, because the condition characterizing this case is the same for
both politicians, they will both set t = αH − 1, irrespectively of what their opponent
does. Therefore, equation (41) can be rewritten as:
siLb = M+ s
j
Lb⇔ s˜iL = sjL +
M
b
(51)
The above equation expresses the number of low quality entrepreneurs needed by
politician Pi in order to secure election victory as a function of the proposal of his
opponent. Also notice that equation (44) becomes in this case:
β˜i = −(1− αL) + q(αH − 1)
s˜iL
(52)
Given the above, the utility for the politician by winning the election is:
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B˜γi =
(
β˜is˜iLI
)γ
=
[(
−(1− αL) + q(α− 1)
s˜iL
)
s˜iLI
]γ
⇔
B˜γi =
(
−(1− αL)s˜iLI + (αH − 1)qI
)γ
⇔
B˜γi =
(
(αH − 1)qI − (1− αL)(sjL +
M
b
)I
)γ
⇔
B˜γi =
(
(αH − 1)qI − (1− αL)
b
MI − (1− αL)sjL
)γ
(53)
On the other hand, the utility for the politician by mimicking his opponent is:
1
2
Bγi =
1
2
(
βis
i
LI
)γ
=
1
2
[(
−(1− αL) + q(αH − 1)
sjL
)
sjLI
]γ
=
1
2
[
q(αH − 1)I − (1− αL)IsjL
]γ
(54)
The politician will choose to mimic iff:
Up > U˜p ⇔ 1
2
Bγi > B˜γi ⇔ Bi > 2
1
γ B˜i ⇔
(αH − 1)qI − (1− αL)IsjL > 2
1
γ
[
(αH − 1)qI − (1− αL)I
b
MI − (1− αL)IsjL
]
⇔
q(αH − 1)I − 2
1
γ q(αH − 1)I + 2
1
γ
(1− αL)I
b
M > −2 1γ (1− αL)− (1− αL)IsjL ⇔
34
sjL >
q(αH − 1)
(1− αL) −
2
1
γ
2
1
γ − 1
M
b
(55)
Hence, the corresponding critical values for this case are:
sjL
∗
= siL
∗
=
q(αH − 1)
(1− αL) −
2
1
γ
2
1
γ − 1
M
b
(56)
Let Φ = 2
1
γ
2
1
γ −1
. Then, the equilibrium value for βi = βj = β is given by:
β∗ = −(1− αL) + q(αH − 1)
s∗L
=
−(1− αL)s∗L + q(αH − 1)
s∗L
⇔
β∗ =
(αL − 1)
[
q(αH−1)
1−αL − ΦMb
]
+ q(αH − 1)
q(αH−1)
1−αL − ΦMb
⇔
β∗ =
(1−αL)ΦM
b
(αH−1)qb−(1−αL)ΦM
(1−αL)b
⇔
β∗ =
(1− αL)2ΦM
(αH − 1)qb− (1− αL)ΦM (57)
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Appendix C: Monopoly of Power Solution
As a benchmark case, it is interesting to study the autocratic case, where there is only
one politician and whose power remains undisputed for all possible policies that do not
violate the public banks’ profitability condition.
If we were to assume that there is a dictator in the economy, whose power is unchal-
lenged, then we implicitly impose that the politician does not face the fear of losing his
position through elections and hence it would be equivalent to imposing the condition
pwin = 1 to P.1 (see also page 10). In other words, under the assumption of autocracy,
P.1 is transformed into (P.1a):
max
sH ,sL,t,β,rL
Up = B
γ s.t.
B = βsLI
(sH + sL) I 6 λI
β + rL 6 αL
rLsLI + sHI + tsHI > λI
0 6 t 6 αH − 1
The above problem is easy to solve. First, notice that all inequalities will hold with
equality in the final solution. If that was not the case, the politician would always
increase his utility by increasing either the share of bad projects which receive funds or
the level of the bribe until the restrictions are satisfied with equality15.
Keeping this in mind and by recursively substituting these conditions into the utility
function we can rewrite the problem as an unconstrained one:
max
rL,t
Up =
[
(αL − rL)
(
λt
1+t−rL
)
I
]γ
s.t.
β = αL − rL
sH = λ− sL
sL =
λt
1+t−rL
0 6 t 6 αH − 1
By taking first order conditions with respect to rL and t, we get the following ex-
15A mathematical way to verify this is to set the Langrangian for the maximization problem and
then show that all Langrange multipliers are strictly positive so that the constraints are binding.
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pressions 16:
∂U
∂rL
= −λtI
1+t−rL −
(αL−rL)(−λtI)
(1+t−rL)2 =
−λtI(1+t−rL)+(αL−rL)λtI
(1+t−rL)2 =
λtI(αL−1−t)
(1+t−rL)2 < 0
and
∂U
∂t
= (αL − rL)I λ(1+t−rL)−λt(1+t−rL)2 = (αL − rL)I
λ(1−rL)
(1+t−rL)2 > 0
The above conditions imply that in order the politician to maximize his utility he
must set the bad projects’ repayment as low as possible and the tax rate as high as
possible. The full set of the monopoly of power solution is:
rL = 0, β = αL, t = αH − 1, sL = λ(αH − 1)
αH
, sH =
λ
αH
and Ump =
[
λαL(αH−1)I
αH
]γ
As should be expected, the dictator, since he does not face any real threat to his
power, sets taxation for good projects to its maximum possible level, expropriating all
their profits, imposes no repayment to low-quality entrepreneurs, in order to receive
maximum possible bribes, and balances the proportion of high and low quality projects
financed so as to maximize his wellbeing. This is a straightforward result that shows
the degree of corruption that is generated by autocratic regimes in the particular set
up of our model.
16Because Upfrac1γ is a monotonic transformation of Up, both of them have their maximum for the
same values of rL and t. For simplification reasons, we derive the first order conditions of the former
expression
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